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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD : Case No. 20030217CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty by the Defendant 
to the charge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With Priors), a 
third-degree felony. The plea of guilty was taken before the Honorable Ernie W. Jones 
on the 18th day of September 2002. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA? 
PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for appeal by 
the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea ( R. 10, 25), and hearings and a 
ruling on that motion.(R. 30, 41) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 
1 
802, 805 (Utah 1993)." The Court applies "the clearly erroneous standard for the trial 
court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 
983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial 
court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a 
guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 
983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 
1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood 
or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — 
Suspension or revocation of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under 
Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that 
is taken illegally in the body; 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-
6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (v), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or 
any district, possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a 
violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless 
driving if committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10 
U.S.C. $815; 
2 
cducaiiwiuii .icneV1 iia-<niN an euuutuuhai series obtained at a substance 
abuse program that is approved by the Hoard o r^-^stanec Abuse and Mental Health 
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
"screening and assessment" means a subsume u.)uu .n. ai*;. and 
dependency screening and assessmeni obtained at a substance abuse piVLiam that is 
approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance ,vith 
Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "serious bounv injury means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function ot an\ bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment -nun ,ai at a >uhstance 
abuse program thai is approved by the Board of Subsinn.v \NJ.S. -,• Me*-* * ' ; 'i1 
in accordance u ith Section 62A-15-105; 
m
 "Substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance 
abuse piugranv 
(g) a violation oi uns section includes a violation, under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure lo 
exercise that degree of care that an ordin u iK MNIM.P ^V -uH pnidor: 'vrsoi. exercises 
under like or similar circumstances 
i.\) (a) \ person max not operate or be in actual physica 
wi?b : tins state if the persor 
n) has sufficient alcoln\ ;n his h u h thai a uhseqaenl chemical test sh- vs 
III , i:»e person has a h\o<\\ •• Nea'.i' alcohol con.entration r?f 08 grams or greater at 
tin • -MI- of the test; 
\\\) is under ihc :.UIUUKC KM mumui, an\ uruLU or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a deurec that HMUW< \\v* — — • -icnoable nf safeK operating 
a \ chicle, * 
i' :L< f '• -: Mcaih alcohol concentration of OS yiaiih «n greater .r! Iln 
time ot operation o\ actual physical control. 
ib« I he fact that a person charged with iolating this section is o\ lias * • • 
iegaii\ uiiiii *.i 4 ^KC alroho1 -M- * drug is not a defense against an\ charge of woiatmg 
this section 
.\k- • > *;.cem.«iiww m mv IMUUO MMH oe based upon grams of alcohol 
re? IM; nnlliliters of blood, and alcohol eoiwnp-itinn in the breath shall be based. 
upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath 
' ' . •) A uMHiciion for a violation of Subsection (2) \\ a ilunl dejuve frlom, il 
If IS' 
-., a tiiiiu m -ui>scquent convictioi 11 n ider this section within ten years of two 





*~:* after it conviction of; 
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(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 
1,2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this 
section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of a 
prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring the 
person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a 
substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and 
long-term closely supervised follow-through after treatment for not less than 240 
hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the court 
orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which may include 
requiring the person to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11 (e) 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
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(B) there is a u^hun oavi> u» me pica, /v lactuai ua>is is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refiises or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish a substantial risk of com -in Jon; 
{?) the defendant knows the minimum .md maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a pica ;> entered, «n hiding the possibility -*r the imposition of 
•:-f>) if the tendered plea is a resuh v?i a -i »-->sion and plea agreement, and 
if so. what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has brc»- advised of the time limits for filing iinv moduli U 
withdraw the plea; and 
•
 ;
 *'••*' H v
 v; (;;a[ me uglii ui appeal is limited. 
These f ndings nun oc uaseu .„. ^ucMioiimg ui mr ucicndant on the record or, if 
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that ihe 
defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement If 
the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient iivn 'w 
statement has been icu l o- translated to the defendant 
I nic.^ >pcciticnliv iu [u ! i a i o\ statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into 
or advise concer t ino jn \ ooU<>iCr:d consequences of a PICJ 
STATEMENT OF THE ( "ASK 
• -, wvicuuant \VHN originally charged in an information filed September iv, 
200? . >M, .
 ; . liWt iL ihiiucncc of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With 
Priors), a third-decree feloir ^ p i e m o c i ».^ .'*»•• ^ 
the Defendant n u d e an initial appearance before the Ho • 
and liic aitoimaiion was read (R. 1), The Defendant had previously been chance,! , 
• nioihei Idnir", I il 'I ,md based upon plea negotiations in the prior case and the present 
5 
case, the Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the present charge on September 18, 
2002. As part of the negotiations, the other felony DUI was dismissed. (R. 1 and 41/ 
3-14) 
The Defendant was sentenced on October 32, 2002, to a term in the Utah State 
Prison not to exceed 5 years. (R. 7 and 41/ 18-22) On November 18, 2002, the 
Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea,(R. 10) and after several 
delays the case was set for hearings and a determination on the motion. On March 5, 
2003, Judge Jones denied the Defendant's motion. (R. 30) 
The Defendant filed his notice of appeal on March 11, 2003.(R. 32) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was originally charged in an information filed September 19, 
2002 with the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With 
Priors), a third-degree felony in violation of §41-6-44 (R. 3). 
The Defendant, pursuant to plea negotiations on this and another similar, 
previously filed case, entered a plea of guilty as charged to Felony DUI. (R. 1) 
At the time of the entry of the guilty plea, the trial court conducted a Rule 11 
colloquy. Attorney Tony Miles represented the Defendant at the hearing. (R.41/2) The 
Defendant acknowledges that, with the exception of voluntariness, the recitation of 
the Defendant's rights as required by Rule 11 was complied within the colloquy. (R. 
41/3-6) These rights included the Defendant's right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, the presumption of 
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innocence, and the right to have the State pay to subpoena any witnesses the 
Defendant desired for his defense. (R. 41/6) The court further advised the Defendant 
of his right to confront the witnesses against him, and the right not to testify at trial, 
and that his decision not to testify could not be used against him. (R. 41/6) The court 
advised the Defendant that the State had the burden of proof, and would be required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense.(R. 41/6) The court also 
went though the elements of the offenses to which the Defendant was pleading guilty. 
(R. 41/5) The court advised the Defendant that by pleading guilty he would be 
waiving these rights. (R. 41/6,7) 
The trial court also went through the possible maximum sentences on the 
charge to which the Defendant was pleading guilty, (R. 41/7,8) The trial court asked 
the Defendant, "Now, you're not under the influence of alcohol or drugs here today in 
court, are you?" The Defendant answered, "No." (R. 41/7) The court went on to 
other items in the colloquy. In a discussion on the Defendant's custody status 
between plea and sentencing, the prosecutor raised the issue that the Defendant had 
been drinking and should be taken into custody. The court asked how the prosecutor 
knew that he had been drinking and the prosecutor stated, "I can tell he's been 
drinking. I can smell it." (R. 41/8) The trial court then made a cursory inquiry as to the 
Defendant's drinking by asking, "Well, I just asked you if you had had anything to 
drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you said no." The Defendant answered, "I'm not 
under the influence of alcohol." The Judge then said, "Okay. You're not under the 
7 
influence of alcohol/' To which the Defendant answered, "No." The Judge then asked, 
"but you have been drinking?" to which the Defendant answered, "I have a little bit of 
a back problem." (R. 41/9) The trial court made no further inquiry as to the amount of 
alcohol consumed by the Defendant, and whether or not he could even competently 
answer the questions regarding his level of intoxication. The court then took the 
Defendant's plea of guilty. (R. 41/10) The court immediately had the Defendant 
taken into custody due in part to the fact that he had been drinking and that "this is 
just too dangerous to leave you out with this kind of situation." (R. 41/14) 
The Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 0-5 years in the 
Utah State Prison on the 23rd day of October 2002. (R. 41/21) On November 18, 
2002, the Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. (R. 10) The 
Defendant followed this motion up with an additional motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea on November 20, 2002. (R. 11) On November 27, 2002, the trial court asked that 
the public defenders be appointed to represent him in this motion, and instructed the 
public defenders to file an amended motion to withdraw his plea. (R. 41/32) 
After several hearings on the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, the 
court again instructed the Defendant's attorneys to file a formal motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. (R. 41/55) On February 13, 2003, the Defendant's attorney Steven 
Laker filed an additional motion asking the court to allow the Defendant to withdraw 
his plea of guilty on the grounds that the Defendant was misrepresented by his 
attorney and that he was intoxicated at the time of the entry of plea. (R. 25) 
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On March 5, 2003, a hearing was held on the Defendant's motion to withdraw 
his plea. Prior to that hearing, the trial judge, the defense attorney and the prosecutor 
viewed a copy of the video of the plea proceedings. (R. 41/61, 66) During this 
hearing, the Defendant stated that "the officer that [took the defendant into custody] 
said 'you've not only been drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 years,' 
and he said I, 'was highly intoxicated at the time'".(R. 41/64) The Defendant further 
stated that the officer was considering charging him with public intoxication. (R. 
41/64) The Defendant then stated, "And after I sobered up I understood how I messed 
up, Your Honor. I should have never done that." (R. 41/64) 
The Defendant told the court that he believed that part of the plea bargain 
included a provision that he could stay out of jail until sentencing and a 
recommendation of "minimum jail time". The Defendant believed that the prosecutor 
violated that promise by asking that he be placed into custody.(R. 41/65) 
The trial court acknowledged that the Defendant had been drinking at the time 
that he entered his guilty plea. (R. 41/65) The trial court ruled that after viewing the 
video of the proceedings, the court didn't see anything that suggested that the 
Defendant was impaired. The trial court stated, "I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't 
see wavering or, or having trouble standing up or talking at all." (R. 41/66) The court 
further stated, "you seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to you and 
your answers appeared to be articulate and coherent." (R. 41/66) 
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The trial court then ruled: "So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. I'm 
also going to find that the plea in this case was both voluntary and knowing. And you 
may have been drinking but I just don't think that you were under the influence of an 
alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of understanding what was going on 
that day." (R. 41/66) The court denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. (R. 41/66) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Defendant knew, understood, and could 
comprehend his rights when he entered his guilty plea. At the time that the Defendant 
entered his plea, he had been drinking alcohol. Although the trial court went through a 
complete Rule 11 colloquy, that recitation of right was given to an individual who, 
due to consumption of alcohol, was unable to know and understand those rights. 
Although the fact that the Defendant had been drinking was brought to the trial court's 
attention within seconds of the plea having been entered, the trial court made no more 
than a cursory inquiry into the Defendant's drinking. The court did not ask how much, 
or when the alcohol had been consumed. The court did not inquire into the 
Defendant's ability to know and understand the Rule 11 recitation of right, and 
therefore the court failed to meet the requirement that the court insure that the 
Defendant knew and understood these rights. The court's subsequent denial of the 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
The Defendant, on September 19, 2002, pursuant to plea negotiations on an 
offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs (With Priors), a third-
degree felony and another similar, previously filed case, entered a plea of guilty as 
charged to Felony DUI. (R. 1) The Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his 
plea of guilty, and the court held several hearings on that motion. On the last of those 
hearing, the trial court heard arguments, heard from the Defendant, and apparently 
viewed the videotape of the plea proceeding. After those hearings, the trial court 
denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. 
The Court in the case of State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993) held that 
the appellate court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
under an abuse-of-discretion standard." The Court has further noted that it applies 
"the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in 
conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) 
"However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of 
11 
law that is reviewed for correctness/' State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 
1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996) 
The trial court therefore, must ensure that the Defendant's plea has strictly met 
all the requirements of Rule 11, as well as meeting all constitutional requirements, and 
any failure in the process requires the granting of a subsequent motion by the 
Defendant to withdraw his plea. A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to grant 
the motion to withdraw the plea when a Rule 11 violation is present. In State v. Mora, 
2003 UT App 117,1| 23 the Court held: 
We hold the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying Mora's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court that accepted the plea failed 
to strictly comply with rule 11 when it accepted Mora's guilty plea 
without correctly incorporating the affidavit into the record or 
establishing elsewhere on the record that Mora knew the State was 
required to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See also State v. Dean, 57 P.3d 1106 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002) where the Court reversed 
a denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea where the trial court violated Rule 
11 by failing to advise him of his speedy trial rights. The Court in State v. Dean, ruled 
that the failure to advise under Rule 11 constituted plain error. In the recent decision 
of State v. Corwell, 2003 Ut App 261 this Court again reversed the trial courts denial 
of a motion to withdraw in a case where the trial court omitted the word "speedy" 
from the discussion of the defendant's rights in the colloquy. In that case the Court 
ruled: " case law requires 'strict compliance with rule 11, rather than substantial 
compliance' when accepting a guilty plea." (State v. Corwell, at ^ 19) 
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The issue before the Court is whether the Defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol at the time he entered his plea. Rule 11 requires that the defendant enter that 
plea voluntarily, and that the defendant "know and understand each of the rights listed 
in Rule 11(e). Although six months after the plea hearing, the trial court made the 
finding that the defendant was not under the influence to the degree that he was 
impaired, the court did not review the appropriate factors. The trial court stated the 
test was: 
[N]ot whether [the defendant] had been drinking, but as Mr. Laker 
points out whether or not you were intoxicated, whether you were so 
impaired that you didn't understand what you were doing at the time you 
stood here in court and entered a guilty plea. That's the real issue 
here.(R.41/64) 
The proper reviewing factors, pursuant to case law cited above, is whether the 
trial court "strictly complied with rule 11." This strict compliance would include 
making a determination as to whether or not the Defendant knew and understood all 
of the rights described to him in the plea colloquy. 
In the case of US. v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1990) the Court allowed 
a plea of guilty to stand where the defendant stated he had been "drinking heavily" 
when he had spoken to his defense counsel during plea negotiations, and had forgotten 
to tell defense counsel of his prior record. (An omission corrected later to the 
probation dept.) Although the Court allowed the plea to stand, in a footnote the Court 
clarified that: "[The defendant] does not allege that he was intoxicated at the time of 
the entry of his plea on May 18, 1989." (Id at footnote 3) 
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In the present case, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his plea, 
based on Rule 11 violations of voluntariness. The Defendant by all accounts had been 
drinking the day that the plea was entered. The Defendant stated that "the officer that 
[took the defendant into custody] said 'you've not only been drinking, Mr. Beckstead, 
I've been an officer for 25 years/ and he said I, 'was highly intoxicated at the 
time"\(R. 41/64) The Defendant further stated that the officer was considering 
charging him with public intoxication. (R. 41/64) The Defendant then stated, "And 
after I sobered up I understood how I messed up, Your Honor. I should have never 
done that." (R. 41/64) 
Although these statements were not part of the original plea hearing, the Court 
in the case of State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 675 (Utah App. 1993) held that: 
Courts considering alleged violations in the taking of guilty pleas are 
"not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the 
petitioner received from his or her attorneys before entering the plea." 
(Quoting Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988(Utah 1993)) 
The trial court error in the present case did not inquire further into the 
Defendant's mental condition once the court had been advised that the Defendant had 
consumed alcohol prior to the plea hearing. The court was clearly aware that the 
Defendant had been drinking to the extent that the prosecutor, sitting at counsel table 
could smell the alcohol emanating from the Defendant as he stood at the lectem. The 
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trial court made no inquiry into the amount of alcohol the Defendant had drunk, nor 
the time frame in which he had consumed the alcohol1. 
Rule 11(e)(3) requires that a pleading defendant "knows of the right to the 
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to 
a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;" (emphasis added) 
Rule 11(e)(4)(A) requires that the defendant "understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;"(emphasis added) 
Finally, Rule 11(e)(5) requires that the pleading defendant "knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature 
of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences;"(emphasis added) 
A defendant that is under the influence of alcohol cannot know, understand, or 
comprehend the significance of any of the above Rule 11 requirements. The Utah 
1
 Although the Defendant did state that he had been drinking "early this morning" (R. 41/9) the trial 
court did not inquire as to how previous that had occurred. Given the fact that the court commenced 
at 2:00 PM, the defendant very well may have been under the influence of alcohol at the time the 
plea was taken. 
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Appellate Courts have required that the trial court insure that these procedural 
requirements of knowledge and understanding are strictly complied with. 
Although there is not a great deal of case law dealing with a defendant being 
under the influence of alcohol during the plea hearing, the Utah Appellate Courts have 
dealt extensively with pleas taken while a defendant is mentally ill. 
In the case of Jacobs v. State, 20 P.3d 382 (Utah 2001) the court, in denying a 
ten year post conviction habeas corpus petition noted that, '"A mentally incompetent 
defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings against such a defendant do not 
comport with due process.' State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989) (citing 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (I960))." In the case of York v. Shulsen, 875 
P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) this Court held: "Due process requires that a 
defendant be competent to plead guilty, (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 
95 S.Ct. 896, 904,43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975))" 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an individual must be 
competent to enter a guilty plea. In the case of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987) the Court placed the burden of ensuring a pleading defendants' competency on 
the trial court, and that inquiry into such should be made at the time a plea in entered. 
In State v. Gibbons the court stated: 
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered. (Id. at 1312) 
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This concept is not only mandated by due process requirements, but is statutory 
as well. UCA §77-15-1 provides that, "[n]o person who is incompetent to proceed 
shall be tried for a public offense." 
The State may argue that even with the failure of the trial court to 
contemporaneously make a determination of the defendant's ability to know, 
understand and comprehend the rights he is waiving, the conviction should stand on 
the grounds of harmless error. Although the trial court is not required to make a 
comprehensive determination of a pleading defendants mental ability in every case, 
when it is brought to the courts attention that the defendant might be under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, further inquiry should be required. The Courts have 
held that an error in a Rule 11 colloquy is not harmless. In the recent case of State v. 
Mora, 2003 UT App 117, the court was presented with a guilty plea that was taken 
with a Rule 11 colloquy that was defective in that the court failed to inform the 
defendant "the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"2. (Id. at ^ J22) 
Given that failure only, the Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that the 
Court presumed harm because, "by not knowing which rights a defendant is waiving, 
the defendant cannot make a fully informed decision." State v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 101, 
104 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). "If the defendant is not fully informed of his rights prior to 
pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary. We cannot accept an 
2
 In State v. Mora, (Infra) the Court found the Rule 11 colloquy defective even where there was an 
affidavit in advance of plea signed by the defendant but not properly incorporated into the record. 
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involuntary guilty plea and still claim to have done justice." {State v. Mora at |^22) 
The Court in State v. Mora went on to hold: 
Under Rule 11(e), the trial court "may not accept the plea" until it has found 
that "the defendant understands . . . that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of [the crime's] elements beyond a reasonable doubt." Utah 
R.Crim.P. 11(e)(4)(A). Thus, since the trial court failed to determine whether Mora 
understood that the State carried the burden of proving him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11. (State v. Mora 
at <pi emphasis added) 
The Utah and Federal Appellate Court's have required reversal of a court's 
decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea when there has been what some 
may consider a minor Rule 11 violation. The Court's have reversed such 
denials for the omission of the word "speedy" and "impartial'XiSVate v. Dean), 
omission of the word "speedy" (State v. Corwell) and omission of the words "beyond 
a reasonable doubt"(5We v. Mora) in the colloquy. Reason and logic would suggest 
that this Court reverse the case at bar on the grounds that there was never an inquiry 
into the Defendant's level of intoxication at the time the plea was entered. If Rule 11 
is violated by an omission of two words, it surely must be violated by a defendant 
who has had enough alcohol to drink that he reeks of liquor to the extent that the 
prosecutor sitting at counsel table can readily smell it. 
18 
The trial court could have easily cured this problem, by simply taking the 
Defendant into custody, continuing the plea hearing until the next weeks criminal 
calendar, and then taking the plea when he could be assured that the Defendant was 
sober. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the failure of the trial court to properly determine that the 
Defendant knew, understood and could comprehend his rights pursuant to the Rule 11 
requirements, and based upon the fact that the plea was entered when the Defendant 
had been drinking alcohol, the Defendant respectfully requests this court reverse the 
trial courts denial of the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, and remand for 
further proceedings. 
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guilty here today. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I understand that. 
THE JUDGE: Now, you're not under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs here today in court, are you? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No. 
THE JUDGE: And have you had enough time to talk 
to Mr. Miles about this? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I haven't talked to 
Mr. Miles. 
MR. MILES: Mr. Allan was here and he had to leave 
so I'm standing in. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So you had enough time to talk 
to Mr. Allan about this? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: And you're satisfied with his 
advice? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: (No recorded response). 
THE JUDGE: Now you understand we've got this, at 
least the other case set for trial here it looks like on the 
26th, and I understand if you plead guilty that's going to be 
dismissed. Okay. 
Now, are you on parole or probation right now? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Do you understand that this carries a 



























to five years. It also carries a $5,000 fine and an 85% 
surcharge on this offense. Any question about that? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No, sir. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Do you need any more time 
to talk to anyone about the case? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: If I plead guilty, I'm in 
was charge of a bunch of livestock on the mountain, I have a, 
a camp. I'd like to have at least a couple of days to, at 
least two days to get them down and find somebody to take 
care of, take care of the animals if I do— 
THE JUDGE: You're not going to be sentenced 
today. I'm going to order what's called a presentence 
report so you'll have some time between now and— 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, the agreement that I had with 
Mr. Allan was that I was going to ask that he be taken into 
custody today. 
THE JUDGE: Oh. 
MS. NEIDER: The reason for that was, otherwise, 
otherwise he would have been felony on felony. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: And frankly, he's been drinking today 
and a, that concerns me. 
THE JUDGE: You say he has been drinking today? 





























UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: October 23rd. 
THE JUDGE: October 23rd. Okay. 
All right. Now, do we need to address this 
question of whether or not we leave him out awaiting 
sentencing? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge that was my a, that's what I 
told Mr. Allan that I would be requesting. Otherwise, he 
would be out on a felony on felony and we could have just 
tried that other case next week. I know he wants time to 
handle this livestock problem. But frankly, I think in 
the interests of safety of the public he be taken into 
custody. 
MR. MILES: Your Honor, and I, and I understand 
that she spoke with Mr. Allan. I, I guess we wouldn't be 
asking, from what he indicates it would just be a day or two 
to get arrangements made but— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Just two days, Your Honor. 
MR. MILES: — we'll submit it to, to 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Beckstead, have you got somebody 
else that can take care of your situation? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I've got to go, I've got to 
go out to (inaudible word) valley and find out if I can get 
the co-owner, co-owner to take over his share of them, I 



























time to take care of this. 
THE JUDGE: I know. But I'm just a little 
concerned about, I'm troubled over somebody who's awaiting 
trial for a drinking offense, and then you commit a new one 
while you're out there. I mean, I gave you the chance to be 
out free on bail. And now you've committed a new crime. And 
now you show up in my court drinking. And I'm just, I'm 
kind of trying to figure out how, why I should let you go is 
what I'm concerned about. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not thinking of myself, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: What? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not thinking of myself 
because (short inaudible, two speakers). 
THE JUDGE: Well I know that, that's pretty 
obvious. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: (Short inaudible, two 
speakers)— 
THE JUDGE: What I'm worried about is those— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: — obligation o f — 
THE JUDGE: — people out in Weber County that 
run the risk of having you run into them. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not driving today. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have anything else, Mr. Miles, 




























MR. MILES: Your Honor, I'm a little tied because 
I believe that was what Bernie and her indicated. But I 
know Mr. Beckstead wanted to inquire about a couple days. 
THE JUDGE: Well, Mr. Beckstead, I'm going to 
revoke your bail and have you taken into custody. I 
understand your situation, but this is just too dangerous to 
leave you out with this kind of a situation. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Is there possibly a furlow 
for 24 hours, to get out for 24 hours? 
THE JUDGE: No. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: To take care of this? 
THE JUDGE: No. I've got you scheduled for 
sentencing on October 23rd. 
So you understand, Mr. Beckstead, you could be 
going to prison on this. This is not some misdemeanor 
anymore. You've got so many priors that you've now, you've 
now made it a felony so. Okay? 
All right. We'll see you on October 23rd. 
Okay? 2:00 o'clock. 
We'll strike that trial date then. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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(March 5, 2003) 
MR. LAKER: This is Larry Beckstead, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. This was on, I guess 
there was, it was a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, was 
there not? 
MR. LAKER: Yes, Your Honor. Actually what 
happened was, was that he filed a, a pro se written motion. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: You ruled that that was, was adequate. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: You pulled me out of another court and 
I came over. And apparently you told me to a, to do... My 
recollection was you told me to talk to Mr. Allan about this, 
which I remembered doing. But I did not in a timely fashion 
file a formal motion to withdraw. I have subsequently done 
that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: And so we're here for oral argument. 
I need to let the Court know that a, Ms. Neider and 
I have been downstairs, we've reviewed the tape of the 
plea. I don't know whether the Court has done that as well. 
THE JUDGE: It's right here. Yes, I've looked at 
it. 
MR. LAKER: There isn't any question, Your Honor, 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
on the tape that a, that, that Mr. Beckstead had been 
drinking. I think Your Honor points that out, I think 
Camille Neider points that out. I think the defendant 
actually points that out. 
I think the question really becomes whether or not 
he was quote unquote intoxicated to the place that he could 
not understand what he was doing. 
In the colloquy to my, you know, what I remember 
hearing is, is that you sort of chewed Mr. Beckstead out 
because he had just got through answering you are you under 
the influence of any alcohol or drugs— 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: — and he said no. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: And a, and then Mrs. Neider pointed 
out that he'd, that a, she felt like he'd been drinking. 
And he stated that he had, that he had had something to 
drink. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: And you chewed him out because you 
said he'd just, just said he hadn't. And his response to 
you was you asked me if I was, if, if I was under the 
influence, not whether I'd been drinking. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 




























I just don't think there's anything in his motion 
that rises to the level of good cause. We would ask that 
you deny his motion then. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Anything else, 
Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: Anything you want to say? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Just that the officer that 
was here when I was arrested said you've not only been 
drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 years, 
and he said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and 
took me downstairs. I said do you want to give me a 
breathalyzer (short inaudible, away from mic), because they 
were going to charge me with public intox (short inaudible, 
away from mic). 
THE JUDGE: Well, you know, I think the real 
question is not whether you had been drinking, but as 
Mr. Laker points out whether or not you were intoxicated, 
whether you were so impaired that you didn't understand what 
you were doing at the time you stood here in court and 
entered a guilty plea. That's, that's the real issue here. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: And after I sobered up I 
understood how I messed up, Your Honor. I should have never 
done that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 



























time you entered your guilty plea. And, and that's why I 
looked at the tape again. 
And as I look at the tape I don't see anything on 
the, the tape that suggests to me that you were impaired. 
And I didn't notice anything at the time we took the plea. I 
mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see wavering or, 
or having trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, 
you seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to 
you and your answers appeared to be articulate and 
coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you had something 
to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your 
ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did. 
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. 
I'm also going to find that the plea in this case was both 
voluntary and knowing. And you may have been drinking but I 
just don't think that you were under the influence of an 
alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of 
understanding what was going on that day. 
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time, 
sir, to withdraw the plea. And we'll leave the sentence 
imposed. 
Now, you do have the right to appeal that— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: We are going to appeal, yes. 
THE JUDGE: — and 30 days— 




























THE JUDGE: — to file a notice. 
MR. LAKER: He has, he has asked me, Your Honor, 
to ask the Court for a post sentence relief, a release 
pending, pending appeal at this time. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, I'm going to deny that 
motion at this time. But you do have 30 days to file an 
appeal s o — 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Can I orally file that right 
now? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. You need it file something in 
writing though within 30 days— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I have. 
THE JUDGE: — but you certainly can put that on 
the record that you want to appeal the ruling. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: Are you going to handle that appeal 
through your lawyers at the prison? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not sure how we're going 
to do this. If you can file an appeal and get it done then 
I'm sure maybe we can have somebody pick it up. I don't know 
how fast I can get the paperwork done in prison and appeal, 
file it, if I can do it in 30 days. 
MR. LAKER: We'll file a notice of appeal. 
THE JUDGE: All right. That will be all then. 
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